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Abstract In this paper, we present a cooperative model of a hierarchically
structured firm to study wage differences between different levels in such a
firm. We consider a class of wage functions that are based on marginal con-
tributions to production. It turns out that the wage of a manager is always at
least as high as the wage of its subordinates. On the other hand, the wage of a
manager never exceeds the sum of the wages of its direct subordinates. These
bounds are sharp in the sense that we can characterize for which production
processes they are reached. For the class of constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production functions this implies that the wage differences are maxi-
mal for linear production functions, and they are minimal for Cobb–Douglas
production functions.
1 Introduction
In most hierarchically structured firms not all wages are equal. Within a par-
ticular hierarchical level, there can be wage differences because of differences
in the importance of the tasks done or the scarcity of the labor inputs that are
able to perform the different tasks. Besides these horizontal wage differences
within levels, there are also vertical wage differences between different levels.
This paper studies this second kind of wage differences. A hierarchically struc-
tured firm is represented by a hierarchical production game which consists of
a set of participants or employees (workers and managers), a hierarchical firm
structure and a cooperative production game.
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Following the seminal paper of Alchian and Demsetz (1972), we assume that
production is in principle a collective effort in which teams of agents access the
productive asset and generate a collective production output value (see also,
Ichiishi 1993). Therefore, we model production as a cooperative game. The firm
structure is assumed to have a tree structure with a unique position at the top.
This implies that there are positions that have no subordinates, i.e. the leafs of
the tree.We assume that the production process is carried out by the employees
on these “bottom” positions, as also done in other models of hierarchical firms
such as, e.g., the seminal papers by Simon (1957), Williamson (1967), Calvo
and Wellisz (1979), Keren and Levhari (1979, 1983), and Radner (1992). We
call these employees the workers of the firm. They form the set of players in
the cooperative production game. The employees in higher levels are manag-
ers or coordinators who organize and coordinate the production process. The
coordination task of managers or coordinators can have various forms, such as
information processing, monitoring, and decentralized decision making. We do
not explicitly specify the role of managers in this paper, but assume that their
role in the production process gives them a higher position in the firm hierarchy.
This paper introduces a cooperative wage system that remunerates the
employees in a firm by assuming that every employee needs approval (or
instructions) of its direct superior in order to be active in the production pro-
cess.1 The wages of the workers and the managers on the different levels of the
firm structure are determined by applying the cooperative concept of marginal
contribution. Themarginal contribution of an employee to a set of employees is
the decrease in production output value when this employee stops being active,
assuming that the given set of employees is active. This implies that the wages
of firm employees not only depend on total production that can be generated
by the fully employed firm, but also depend on the production capabilities
of subsets of employees, i.e. on the production that can be generated by the
firm if some positions are vacant. Taking a weighted average over all marginal
contributions of a particular player yields its weighted average marginal con-
tribution. Since we require budget neutrality of the wage function, i.e. the sum
of all wages is exactly equal to the production output value of the fully em-
ployed firm, we normalize the weighted average marginal contributions so that
we obtain a budget neutral wage function that distributes the total production
output value proportional to the weighted average marginal contributions of
the employees. Our main results show that according to these wage functions,
the wage of a manager always is at least as high as the wage of every employee
that is subordinate to this manager. On the other hand, the wage of a manager
never exceeds the sum of the wages of its direct subordinates. It is also shown
that these bounds are sharp in the sense that there are production technologies
for which these bounds are reached. A manager earns the same wage as one
of its subordinates if this subordinate is indispensable for the manager, i.e. the
workers that are coordinated by the manager but not by this subordinate need
1 Gilles et al. (1992) introduced this approach in a general (cooperative) game theoretic setting.
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workers that are coordinated by the subordinate in order to be productive. A
manager earns the sum of the wages of its direct subordinates if all its subordi-
nate workers are so-called dummy workers, i.e. there are no synergies when a
subordinate worker cooperates with other workers.
In order to focus on the hierarchical aspect of vertical wage differences, we
also consider the special case in which all workers are identical in the produc-
tion process, and all managers within one level take similar positions in the
hierarchical firm structure in the sense that the firm has constant span of con-
trol, i.e. every manager has the same number of direct subordinates. In that case
the ratio between the wage of a manager and each of its direct subordinates
lies between one and the span of control. These bounds are often assumed and
supported in the literature, see e.g., Simon (1957),Williamson (1967), Calvo and
Wellisz (1978, 1979), Carlson (1982), and Radner (1992). For firms producing
according to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production technology,
this implies that the ratio between the wage of a manager and each of its direct
subordinates reaches the upper bound (equal to the span of control) for linear
production technologies with substitutable labor inputs, while it reaches the
lower bound (equal to one) for Cobb–Douglas production technologies with
indispensable labor inputs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model of a hierar-
chically structured firm. In Sect. 3, we introduce the class of weighted average
marginal contributions (WAMC) wage functions. In Sect. 4, we state the main
results on comparing wages between different hierarchical levels within a firm.
In Sect. 5, we state some additional properties and characterize the WAMC-
wage functions. Section 6 illustrates the model using the Shapley wage function
[based on the Shapley value for cooperative games, see Shapley (1953)] in a
particular CES production firm. Section 7 contains concluding remarks and
relations to the literature. Finally, all proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 Hierarchically structured firms
Ahierarchically structured firm is modelled as a triple (N,S, v), where the finite
set N is the set of employees in the firm, S represents the hierarchical structure
of the firm, and v is a production game describing the potential production
possibilities of the workers in the firm.
2.1 The firm structure
The firm structure S : N → 2N with i ∈ S(i) is a mapping that assigns to every
employee i ∈ N in a firm those employees that are directly subordinate to i.
These direct subordinates in the set S(i) ⊂ N are called the successors2 of i.
On the other hand, the employees in the set S−1(i) := {j ∈ N | i ∈ S(j)} are
2 Note that the mapping S describes a directed graph {(i, j) ∈ N × N | i ∈ N, j ∈ S(i)}.
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i’s direct superiors and are referred to as the predecessors of i. BŷS we denote
the transitive closure of the firm structure S, i.e., j ∈ ̂S(i), if and only if there
exists a sequence of employees (h1, . . . ,ht) such that h1 = i, hk+1 ∈ S(hk),
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t − 1, and ht = j. We refer to the employees in ̂S(i) as the
subordinates of employee i. Similarly, we refer to the employees in the set
̂S−1(i) = {j ∈ N | i ∈ ̂S(j)} as the superiors of employee i. As usual in the firm
literature, we assume that the firm has a tree structure, i.e., there is a unique
root or top-position i0 having no predecessors and being a superior to all other
positions, while all other positions have exactly one predecessor and are not
subordinate to themselves. Formally,
• there is exactly one employee i0 ∈ N such that S−1(i0) = ∅ and ̂S(i0) =
N \ {i0};
• for every i ∈ N \ {i0} it holds that |S−1(i)| = 1 and i ∈ ̂S(i),
where |E| denotes the cardinality of E ⊆ N. By S having a tree structure it fol-
lows that there always exist employees that haveno successors. These employees
are referred to as the workers in S and the set of workers in S is denoted by
WS = {i ∈ N | S(i) = ∅}. We assume that these workers operate the production
process in the firm. The other employees are themanagers or coordinators who
do not actively produce but who coordinate the production process. The set
of managers in S is denoted by MS = N \ WS. For a manager i ∈ MS, the set
S(i) = ̂S(i)∩WS is the set of workers that are (directly or indirectly) subordinate
to i. For notational convenience, we denote S(i) = {i} for every worker i ∈ WS.
Example 2.1 Consider the set of employees N = {1, . . . , 8} and firm structure
S given by S(1) = S(2) = S(3) = S(4) = ∅, S(5) = {1, 2}, S(6) = {3, 4}, S(7) =
{6}, S(8) = {5, 7} (see Fig. 1).
The set of workers in the firm structure S is WS = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The set of
managers in S is the set MS = {5, 6, 7, 8}. The set of all (direct and indirect)
subordinates of manager 7 is the set̂S(7) = {3, 4, 6}. The workers subordinate
to manager 7 are the ones in the set S(7) = {3, 4}.
2.2 The production game
Since the production process is carried out by the workers in WS, its power set
is the domain of the (cooperative) production game v : 2WS → R+. The value
v(E) ∈ R+ is the nonnegative production output value that can be generated
Fig. 1 The firm structure S of
Example 2.1
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if exactly the workers in E ⊆ WS are active in the production process.3 So, it
is assumed that every worker i ∈ WS can choose either to provide all its labor
effort or to provide nothing at all. Alternatively, we can think that firm positions
can be occupied by employees or be vacant.
We refer to a triple (N,S, v) as a hierarchical production game. Throughout
the paper we assume that the production game satisfies the zero input condition
meaning that nothing can be produced if there are no workers to operate the
production process, i.e. v(∅) = 0. We also require the productive fully employed
firm condition meaning that a fully employed firm produces a positive produc-
tion output value, i.e. v(WS) > 0. Other properties that are sometimes required
are the following. A production game v is monotone if v(E) ≤ v(F) whenever
E ⊆ F. A production technology that exhibits complementarities with respect
to the labor inputs is represented by a supermodular production game4 meaning
that v(E) + v(F) ≤ v(E ∪ F) + v(E ∩ F) for all E,F ⊆ WS.
3 Wage functions based on marginal contributions
The pay system that is used in rewarding the various positions in the firm is
given by a wage function ϕ that assigns a nonnegative wage ϕi(N,S, v) to every
employee i ∈ N in the corresponding hierarchical production game (N,S, v). A
basic requirement for wage functions is that they always exactly distribute the
total production output value over the employees, i.e.
∑
i∈N ϕi(N,S, v) = v(WS)
for all (N,S, v). This property is referred to as budget neutrality.5
We consider a class of wage functions according to which the wages of
employees are determined by some weighted average of their marginal con-
tributions to production. We do this in two steps. First, we need to extend the
domain of the production game v to make it a game on all employees in N.
We do this by adding all managers in MS as null players to the production
game v, i.e. as players who do not contribute to any coalition. So, we define the
game v : 2N → R+ by v(E) = v(E ∩ WS) for all E ⊆ N. To acknowledge their
management role in the production process, we follow Gilles et al. (1992), and
define the modified production game rS,v : 2N → R+ by rS,v(E) = v(sov(E)),
where sov(E) = {i ∈ E | ̂S−1(i) ⊂ E} is the sovereign part of E, i.e. it is the set
of those employees in E whose superiors all belong to E. This reflects the idea
that in order to activate a worker, all its superior managers should be active or
3 Assuming labor cost to be the only cost, and the firm to be a perfect competitor on its output
market, this production output value is the value added that is generated by these labor inputs, i.e.
the output multiplied by the competitive output price.
4 In the game theory literature this property is usually referred to as convexity. Milgrom and
Roberts (1994) stress the importance of coordination for supermodular production technologies.
5 In game theory terminology this property is called efficiency. The model can be easily adapted to
include profits. In that case budget neutrality states that the sum of all wages and profit equals the
total production output value. Since we concentrate on the internal wage distribution, we ignore
profit in this paper.
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approve of the action taken by the worker. (Note that, equivalently, we could
say that every worker and manager needs approval of its predecessor.)
The marginal contribution MEi (N,S, v) of employee i ∈ N to the set of
employees E ⊆ N in the hierarchical production game (N,S, v) is the decrease
in production output value according to the modified production game rS,v
when employee i stops being active, given that E is the set of active employees,
i.e. MEi (N,S, v) = rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {i}).
Next, we assign to every employee i ∈ N its weighted average marginal
contribution according to some positive weight system ω = (ω1, . . . ,ω|N|) with
ωk > 0,k ∈ {1, . . . , |N|}. These weights ωk express the importance of coalitions
of different size k in determining wages.6 The corresponding weighted average
marginal contribution7 then is given by
mωi (N,S, v) =
∑
E⊆N
i∈E
ω|E|MEi (N,S, v) =
∑
E⊆N
i∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {i})) (1)
=
∑
E⊆N
i∈E
ω|E|(v(sov(E)) − v(sov(E \ S(i))))
=
∑
E⊆N
i∈E
ω|E|
(
v(S¯(sov(E))) − v(S¯(sov(E))\S(i))).
Since mω(N,S, v) need not be budget neutral, we normalize the weighted aver-
age marginal contributions of the players so that we obtain a budget neutral
wage function that distributes the total production output value proportional
to the weighted average marginal contributions of the employees. Following
van der Laan and van den Brink (1998), we assign to every player a share
mωi (N,S,v)
∑
j∈N mωj (N,S,v)
in the production output value, and obtain the corresponding
budget neutral wage function ϕω that is given by
ϕωi (N,S, v) =
mωi (N,S, v)
∑
j∈N mωj (N,S, v)
· v(WS) for all i ∈ N. (2)
We call these weighted average marginal contributions (or shortly WAMC)
wage functions. (Note that the productive fully employed firm condition implies
that v(WS) and
∑
j∈N mωj (N,S, v) are both positive.) As mentioned above, the
weights express the importance of the coalitions of different sizes in determin-
ing wages. The extreme case where we just take the average marginal con-
tribution, i.e. taking weights ωBk = 12|N|−1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , |N|}, yields the
6 In van den Brink et al. (2007) these weights are related to the cultural dimension of collectiv-
ism–individualism as considered in Hofstede (1980). In van den Brink and Ruys (2005) this model
is used to endogenously determine firm size.
7 Weber (1988) treats these as solutions for TU-games and calls them symmetric probabilistic
values.
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normalized Banzhaf value of the modified production game which is axiom-
atically characterized in van den Brink and van der Laan (1998) in a game
theoretic context.8 The unique wage function for which the marginal contribu-
tions themselves are budget neutral, and thus need not be normalized, are the
weights ωShk = (|N|−k)!(k−1)!|N|! for all k ∈ {1, . . . , |N|}, that yield wages based on
the Shapley value of the modified game.9
4 Comparing wages between different hierarchical levels
The main purpose of this paper is to compare the wage of a manager in a
hierarchical production game with the wages of its successors. We assume any
weight system ω = (ω1, . . . ,ω|N|) with ωk > 0,k ∈ {1, . . . , |N|}, to be given. In
the literature, it is often argued that the wage of a manager in a firm is at least as
high as the wage of any of its subordinates, see e.g., Simon (1957), Williamson
(1967), Calvo andWellisz (1978, 1979), andCarlson (1982). This property, which
we refer to as vertical monotonicity, is satisfied by all WAMC-wage functions
in case the production game is monotone. Moreover, if the production game is
also supermodular, then according to any WAMC-wage function ϕω the wage
of a manager does not exceed the sum of the wages of its successors.
Theorem 4.1 Consider a hierarchical production game (N,S, v) and manager
i ∈ MS.
(i) If v is monotone then ϕωi (N,S, v) ≥ ϕωj (N,S, v) for all j ∈ S(i);
(ii) If v is monotone and supermodular then ϕωi (N,S, v) ≤
∑
j∈S(i) ϕωj (N,S, v).
The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix A.10 If firm (N,S, v)
has constant span of control, meaning that every manager has the same number
of successors s, then Theorem 4.1 implies that the ratio between the wage of a
manager and the average wage of its successors (if positive) lies between one
and the span of control s. If moreover, the workers inWS are identical, meaning
that v(E) = v(F) for all E,F ⊆ WS with |E| = |F|, Theorem 4.1 yields the
following corollary.
8 This is the normalization of the nonefficient Banzhaf value as considered in e.g., Owen (1975) and
Dubey and Shapley (1979) and is a generalization to TU-games of the Banzhaf index introduced
in Banzhaf (1965) as a power index for voting games.
9 The Shapley value (Shapley 1953) is one of the most applied solutions for TU-games. In firm
models it has been applied in, e.g. Hart and Moore (1990) and Rajan and Zingales (1998). Taking
the Shapley value of the modified game as wage function is a special case of the conjunctive and
disjunctive permission value for games with a permission structure as characterized in van den
Brink and Gilles (1996) and van den Brink (1997), respectively.
10 As follows from this proof, for the first inequality to hold we do not need the assumption that
only workers that have no successors are productive. The second inequality needs this assumption.
However, allowing productive workers in all levels we can prove in a similar way that ϕωi (N, S, v) ≤
∑
j∈S(i) ϕωj (N, S, v) whenever i ∈ MS is a null player in the production game v defined on 2N .
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Corollary 4.2 For every hierarchical production game (N,S, v) with monotone
and supermodular v, identical workers and constant span of control s, it holds
that 1 ≤ ϕωi (N,S,v)
ϕωj (N,S,v)
≤ s for all i ∈ MS and j ∈ S(i) with ϕωj (N,S, v) > 0.
The bounds derived in this corollary are often assumed in the literature, see
e.g. Williamson (1967). Next we argue that the bounds for the wage ratios given
in Theorem 4.1 are sharp in the sense that there are hierarchical production
games such that the inequalities are equalities. We first characterize the follow-
ing types of subordinates of amanager. Successor j of manager i is indispensable
for i if every worker h that is coordinated by i, but not by j, does not increase the
productivity of any set of workers that does not contain workers coordinated
by j (or j if j itself is a worker). In other words, the workers that are coordinated
by i but not by j need workers that are coordinated by j (or j itself) in order to
be productive.
Second, worker h is a dummy worker if it increases the productivity of every
set of workers by the value v({h}) which it also can produce on its own. In other
words, there are no synergies when h cooperates with other workers.
Definition 4.3 In the hierarchical production game (N,S, v)
(i) j ∈ S(i) is indispensable for i ∈ MS if v(E) = v(E \ {h}) for every
h ∈ S(i) \ S(j) and every E ⊂ WS with E ∩ S(j) = ∅;
(ii) h ∈ WS is a dummy worker if v(E) = v(E\{h})+v({h}) for everyE ⊆ WS
with h ∈ E.
We characterize hierarchical production games for which the bounds of The-
orem 4.1 are reached using indispensable and dummy workers. It turns out
that a manager earns the same wage as one of its successors if this successor
is indispensable for the manager. A manager earns the sum of the wages of its
successors if all its subordinate workers are dummy workers.
Theorem 4.4 Consider a hierarchical production game (N,S, v) and manager
i ∈ MS.
(i) If j ∈ S(i) is indispensable for i in (N,S, v) then ϕωi (N,S, v) = ϕωj (N,S, v);
(ii) If every h ∈ S(i) is a dummy worker in (N,S, v) then ϕωi (N,S, v) =
∑
j∈S(i) ϕωj (N,S, v).
Again, the proof can be found in Appendix A.11 A class of production
functions that gained a lot of attention in the literature is the class of con-
stant elasticity of substitution production functions. A production function with
11 Redefining indispensability by saying that successor j of manager i is indispenable for i if every
employee h that is coordinated by i and not by j does not increase the production value of any set
of employees that does not contain j and employees coordinated by j, the first statement also holds
for firms where production takes place at any level (and not necessarily only on the bottom level
with no successors). Redefining dummy workers by saying that employee h is a dummy employee
if h and all its subordinates j ∈ ̂S(h) increase the productivity of every set of employees by the
value which they also can produce on their own, the second statement also holds for firms where
production takes place at any level.
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n inputs f : Rn+ → R+ is a supermodular CES production function if there
exists ρ ∈ (0, 1], γ > 0 and α1, . . . ,αn > 0 with
∑n
i=1 αi = 1 such that f (x) =
γ
(∑n
i=1 αi(xi)ρ
) 1
ρ . The parameter γ is a scale parameter and ρ is a parameter
expressing the substitutability of the inputs. We need ρ > 0 to obtain a su-
permodular production function. In our model the n inputs are the |WS| labor
inputs. Then xi ≥ 0 is the amount of labor that is provided by worker i ∈ WS.
Since we assume that workers can be either fully active or inactive, we represent
the situation in which exactly the workers in the set E ⊆ WS are active by the
labor input vector xE ∈ {0, 1}|WS| given by xEi = 1 if i ∈ E, and xEi = 0 otherwise.
Assuming identical workers (i.e. αi = 1n , i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}) and constant span of
control, the CES production game then can be written as vρ(E) = γ
( |E|
|WS|
) 1
ρ .
For a hierarchical supermodular CES production game with constant span of
control and identical workers the results in this section imply that the ratio
between the wage of a manager and the wage of each of its successors is equal
to the span of control s in case we have a linear production game with substitut-
able labor inputs12 (i.e. ρ = 1), while it is equal to one in case the production
game is a Cobb–Douglas production game with indispensable labor inputs (i.e.
ρ → 0).
5 Properties of WAMC wage functions
In this section, we discuss some properties of WAMC wage functions. It turns
out that, besides the earlier mentioned properties of budget neutrality and ver-
tical monotonicity [see Theorem 4.1.(i)], all these wage functions satisfy the
following properties. First, an employee i is an inessential employee in hierar-
chical production game (N,S, v) if every worker that is coordinated by i, or
i itself if it is a worker, does not add anything in the production process, i.e.
if v(E) = v(E \ {j}) for every j ∈ S(i) and E ⊆ WS. The inessential employee
property states that inessential employees are assigned a wage equal to zero.
Second, a worker i is a necessary worker if, without its labor effort nothing
can be produced, i.e. if v(E) = 0 for all E ⊆ WS \ {i}. The necessary worker
property states that necessary workers always earn at least as much as any
other employee in the firm in case the production game is monotone. Every
WAMC-wage function is characterized by the above mentioned four proper-
ties together with a weighted additivity which states how payoffs are deter-
mined if we add production games in the same firm structure.13 Since the
weighted marginal contribution vectors corresponding to the Shapley weights
are budget neutral by themselves, the Shapley wage function ϕSh = ϕωSh is
additive meaning that for two production games v, z and firm structure S it
12 Note that, e.g.,Williamson (1967) andRajan andZingales (2001) only consider linear production
technologies and therefore cannot study the effect of labor substitutability on wages.
13 General weighted additivity properties of share functions for TU-games are considered in van
der Laan and van den Brink (1998).
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holds that ϕSh(N,S, v+z) = ϕSh(N,S, v)+ϕSh(N,S, z), where production game
(v+ z) : 2WS → R+ is given by (v+ z)(E) = v(E)+ z(E) for all E ⊆ WS. For the
otherWAMC-wage functions themarginal contributions need to be normalized
by the factor v(WS)∑
j∈N mωj (N,S,v)
. The reciprocal of this factor somehowmeasures how
much the average weighted marginal contributions yield an excess (or deficit)
on the budget. Since we only consider budget neutral wage functions, when
adding two production games it seems reasonable to use these factors in deter-
mining the wages from those in the separate production games. Given some
positive weight system ω = (ω1, . . . ,ω|N|), the corresponding WAMC-wage
function ϕω satisfies ω-additivity meaning that for every pair of production
games v, z and firm structure S it holds that
∑
j∈N mωj (N,S,v+z)
(v+z)(WS) ϕ(N,S, v + z) =
∑
j∈N mωj (N,S,v)
v(WS)
ϕ(N,S, v) +
∑
j∈N mωj (N,S,z)
z(WS)
ϕ(N,S, z).
Theorem 5.1 A wage function satisfies budget neutrality, vertical monotonicity,
the inessential employee property, the necessary worker property andω-additivity
if and only if it equals ϕω.
The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix B which also shows
logical independence of the properties. An additional property that is relevant
for analyzing remuneration in firms is self-duality of a wage function mean-
ing that the wages in a hierarchical production game (N,S, v) are the same if,
instead of the modified game rS,v we consider its dual r∗S,v : 2N → R+ which
assigns to every subset of employees the production output value that is lost
by the fully employed firm if the employees in E leave the firm, i.e. r∗S,v(E) =
rS,v(N) − rS,v(N \ E) for all E ⊆ N. Although we measured the importance of
firm employees in the production of the firm by considering their contributions
to production, the importance of firm employees often is measured in terms of
what happens with production if employees leave the firm or stop being active.
We call aWAMC-wage function ϕω self-dual if ϕω(N,S, v) = ϕω∗(N,S, v)where
ϕω
∗
i (N,S, v) = m
ω∗
i (N,S,v)
∑
j∈N mω
∗
j (N,S,v)
· v(WS), with mω∗i (N,S, v) =
∑
E⊆N
i∈E
ω|E|(r∗S,v(E) −
r∗S,v(E\{i})) for every i ∈ N and hierarchical production game (N,S, v). For self-
dual wage functions it does not matter which of the two approaches we take.
Proposition 5.2 If the positive weight system ω = (ω1, . . . ,ω|N|) satisfies ωk =
ω|N|−k+1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , |N|}, then the corresponding WAMC-wage function
ϕω is self-dual.
The straightforward proof of this proposition also can be found in Appendix
B. In particular the condition on the weight system in Proposition 5.2 holds for
the Banzhaf- and Shapley wage functions14 mentioned at the end of Sect. 3.
Moreover, given any WAMC-wage function ϕω, defining the weight system
ω = (ω1, . . . ,ω|N|) by ωk = 12 (ωk + ω|N|−k+1) yields a self-dual WAMC-wage
function ϕω.
14 For the Shapley wage function this also follows directly from the dual game property of the
Shapley value as shown by Kalai and Samet (1987).
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6 An example: the Shapley wage function and constant elasticity
of substitution production technologies
In this section, we provide an illustration of a hierarchical production game and
the results of the previous sections using the specific Shapley wage function
(which is based on the Shapley value) and CES production functions.
Consider a two-level firm with three employees and firm structure S on
N = {1, 2, 3} given by S(1) = S(2) = ∅ and S(3) = {1, 2} (see Fig. 2). Sup-
pose that the firm produces an output with two identical labor inputs (that can
be provided by the workers 1 and 2) according to a CES production function
f (x) = γ
(
1
2 ((x1)
ρ + (x2)ρ)
) 1
ρ , with γ > 0 and ρ ∈ (0, 1]. This yields the CES
production game vρ : 2WS → R+ given by
vρ(E) = γ
(
1
2
|E|
) 1
ρ =
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
0 if |E| = 0
γ
(
1
2
) 1
ρ if |E| = 1
γ if |E| = 2.
The wages according to the Shapley wage function (with ωSh1 = ωSh2 = 12 ) for
the manager 3 and the workers 1 and 2 are
ϕSh3 (N,S, vρ) =
γ
3
(
1 +
(
1
2
) 1
ρ
)
and ϕShi (N,S, vρ) =
γ
3
(
1 −
(
1
2
) 1
ρ
+1)
for i ∈ {1, 2}.
The ratio between the wages of manager 3 and workers 1 and 2, denoted by
δ(ρ), then is given by
δ(ρ) = ϕ
Sh
3 (N,S, vρ)
ϕSh1 (N,S, vρ)
= 1 + (1/2)
1
ρ
1 − (1/2) 1ρ +1
for ρ ∈ (0, 1].
Note that δ(ρ) does not depend on the scale parameter γ . Since dδ(ρ)dρ =
− 3 ln(1/2)(1/2)
1
ρ +1
(ρ(1−(1/2) 1ρ +1))2
> 0 for ρ ∈ (0, 1], this ratio is increasing in ρ, i.e. the difference
between the wages of the manager and the workers increases if the substitut-
ability of the labor inputs increases.
If ρ = 1 then production takes place according to a linear production tech-
nology with substitutable labor inputs and production game v1(E) = γ2 (|E|).
In this case, the workers 1 and 2 are both dummy workers. The wages of the
Fig. 2 Firm structure S of a
two-level firm with s = 2
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employees are ϕSh3 (N,S, v1) = γ2 and ϕShi (N,S, v1) = γ4 for i ∈ {1, 2}, and thus
the ratio δ(1) is equal to the span of control s = 2.
If ρ → 0 then the production game approaches a Cobb–Douglas production
game given by v0(E) = γ xE1 xE2 , and thus is given by v0(E) = γ if E = WS, and
v0(E) = 0 otherwise. Both labor inputs are indispensable in order to produce a
positive production output value. In this case, the wages are equal and given by
ϕShi (N,S, v0) = γ3 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and thus δ(0) = 1.
For the intermediate case with ρ = 12 the production game is given by
v1/2(E) = γ4 (|E|)2. In this case the wages are ϕSh3 (N,S, v1/2) = 512 and
ϕShi (N,S, v1/2) = 724 for i ∈ {1, 2}, and thus δ( 12 ) = 107 . So, 1 < δ( 12 ) < s.
7 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this paper is to gain insight in the internal wage distribution in
a hierarchically structured firm of given size. Although most literature on the
firm uses noncooperative game theory (which is suitable to analyze situations
where binding agreements are not possible), we used a cooperative game theo-
retic model in which coalitions or teams of workers can generate a production
output valuewhen they are coordinated by theirmanagers and agree to perform
the task assigned to their position.
It is our belief that for understanding firms as production organizations, even-
tually concepts from both cooperative and noncooperative decision making are
needed. There is a large literature on noncooperative models of firms using,
for example, principal-agent theory to explain issues of moral hazard (see, e.g.,
Holmström 1979 and Grossman and Hart 1983). With the model presented in
this paper we try to complement this literature with a cooperative model. We
showed that the wage functions derived in this way have properties that fit with
assumptions made in the literature on the firm. Although the main attention in
the Theory of the Firm is still on noncooperative models, some interesting other
attempts have been made to incorporate cooperative behavior in understand-
ing firms, such as the literature on incomplete contracts and collective binary
decision making. The literature on incomplete contracts tries to explain the dis-
tribution of residual rights concerning the control over noncontractable assets
(see, e.g., Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990, 1999; Maskin and
Tirole 1999). While in this literature the ownership of assets is central, in the
underlying paper it is not ownership but, as formulated by Rajan and Zingales
(1998), the control of access to a productive asset which is the issue. When a
worker occupies a position in a firm this means that he gets access to the pro-
duction facilities. In return for his wage, the worker offers his labor input which
generates the production output value when operating the production facility.
When a manager occupies a position then he gets (partial) control over the
access of his subordinates to the productive asset. He earns his compensation
by using this control in a way to facilitate his subordinate workers so that they
can generate an output value.
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In the hierarchical production game of this paper, a worker needs permis-
sion from all its superiors to be active in the production process. This is closely
related to hierarchies in the sense of, e.g. Sah and Stiglitz (1986), Ben-Yashar
and Nitzan (2001) and Koh (2005), who consider a collective decision maker
that has to choose whether to accept or reject a project proposal. In a hierarchy
a project proposal is accepted if and only if all individuals accept. Instead of
evaluating the performance of the firm as a collective decision maker, in this
paper we focussed on the distribution of the given earnings of the firm over the
individual employees. As an alternative to a hierarchy, Sah and Stiglitz (1986)
also consider a polyarchy in which a project proposal is accepted if and only
if at least one individual accepts. To study polyarchies we need to apply the
more general games with (acyclic) permission structures being games in which
the players in a cooperative TU-game are part of a hierarchical (permission)
structure such that players need permission from their predecessors to coop-
erate with other players. In these acyclic permission structures every player
can have more than one predecessor. Two approaches are distinguished. In the
conjunctive approach as developed in Gilles et al. (1992) and van den Brink
and Gilles (1996), players need permission from all their predecessors in order
to cooperate. On the other hand, in the disjunctive approach as developed in
Gilles and Owen (1994) and van den Brink (1997) every player (except the
top-player) needs permission from at least one of its predecessors. In this sense
a polyarchy as a collective decision making organization is closely related to
the disjunctive approach, while a hierarchy is closely related to the conjunctive
approach. Clearly, for permission tree structures as considered in this paper
these two approaches are the same.
Another special class of games with a permission structure in which the per-
mission structure is a tree are the peer group games as introduced in Brânzei
et al. (2002). Instead of considering the (production) game to be defined on the
set of players that have no successors, in peer group games the original game is
defined on the set of all players, but it is an additive game, i.e. every coalition
can generate a worth equal to the sum of the worths that the members of the
coalition can earn on their own. For the purpose of the underlying paper peer
group games are not suitable since by additive games we can only model linear
production firms, and thus differences in labor substitutability cannot be studied
by that model. Studying the effect of such differences has been the main topic
of this paper.
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Appendix A: Proofs of Sect. 4
In this appendix, we give the proofs of the main theorems of the paper stated in
Sect. 4. We use the following results for hierarchical production games (N,S, v)
which follow from Gilles et al. (1992):
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(i) If v is monotone then rS,v is monotone, i.e. rS,v(E) ≤ rS,v(F) for all
E ⊆ F ⊆ N
(ii) If v ismonotone and supermodular then rS,v is supermodular, i.e. rS,v(E)+
rS,v(F) ≤ rS,v(E ∪ F) + rS,v(E ∩ F) for all E,F ⊆ N.
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Let (N,S, v) be a hierarchical production game.
(i) For every i ∈ MS and j ∈ S(i), monotonicity of rS,v implies the following
facts (which follow from a more general result in van den Brink and Gilles
1996):
(a) Since sov(E) = sov(E \ {j}) for all E ⊂ N with i ∈ E, it holds that
rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {j}) = 0 for all E ⊂ N with i ∈ E, j ∈ E;
(b) Since sov(E\{i}) ⊆ sov(E) for allE ⊆ N, it holds that rS,v(E)−rS,v(E\{i}) ≥
0 for all E ⊂ N with i ∈ E, j ∈ E;
(c) Since sov(E\{i}) ⊆ sov(E\{j}) for allE ⊆ N, it holds that rS,v(E)−rS,v(E\
{j}) ≤ rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {i}) for all E ⊆ N with i, j ∈ E.
With this it follows that
mωi (N,S, v) =
∑
E⊆N
i∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {i}))
=
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
∑
E⊆N
i,j∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {i}))
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠
+
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
∑
E⊂N
i∈E,j ∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {i}))
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠
≥
∑
E⊆N
i,j∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {j}))
=
∑
E⊆N
j∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {j})) = mωj (N,S, v).
Since ϕω(N,S, v) is obtained by normalizing these marginal contributions
according to (2), it follows that ϕωi (N,S, v) ≥ ϕωj (N,S, v).
(ii) By monotonicity and supermodularity of rS,v, for every i ∈ MS with
S(i) = {j1, . . . , js}, we have for every k ∈ {1, . . . , s} and E ⊆ N that
rS,v(E) ≥ rS,v(E \ {jk}) + rS,v
⎛
⎝E \
s
⋃
l=k+1
{jl}
⎞
⎠ − rS,v
(
E \
s
⋃
l=k
{jl}
)
.
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But then
(s − 1)rS,v(E) =
s−1
∑
k=1
rS,v(E)
≥
s−1
∑
k=1
⎛
⎝rS,v(E \ {jk}) + rS,v
⎛
⎝E \
s
⋃
l=k+1
{jl}
⎞
⎠ − rS,v
(
E \
s
⋃
l=k
{jl}
)
⎞
⎠
=
s−1
∑
k=1
(
rS,v(E \ {jk})
) + rS,v(E \ {js}) − rS,v
(
E \
s
⋃
l=1
{jl}
)
=
s
∑
k=1
rS,v(E \ {jk}) − rS,v
(
E \
s
⋃
l=1
{jl}
)
=
∑
j∈S(i)
rS,v(E \ {j}) − rS,v(E \ S(i)).
Since all players inMS arenull players in v, it holds that rS,v(E\{i}) = rS,v(E\S(i))
for every i ∈ MS, and thus (s − 1)rS,v(E) ≥ ∑j∈S(i) rS,v(E \ {j}) − rS,v(E \ {i}),
which is equivalent to
rS,v(E)− rS,v(E \ {i}) ≤ srS,v(E)−
∑
j∈S(i)
rS,v(E \ {j})=
∑
j∈S(i)
(rS,v(E)− rS,v(E \ {j})).
With (1) it follows that mωi (N,S, v) ≤
∑
j∈S(i) mωj (N,S, v), and thus with (2), it
follows that ϕωi (N,S, v) ≤
∑
j∈S(i) ϕωj (N,S, v). unionsq
Proof of Theorem 4.4
Let (N,S, v) be a hierarchical production game and let i ∈ MS.
(i) Let j ∈ S(i) be indispensable for i ∈ MS. Then
(a) rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {i}) = 0 if i ∈ E, j ∈ E;
(b) rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {j}) = 0 if i ∈ E, j ∈ E;
(c) rS,v(E) = rS,v(E \ S(i)) for all E ⊂ N with E ∩ S(j) = ∅.
From this and the facts that rS,v(E\{i}) = rS,v(E\S(i)), rS,v(E\{j}) = rS,v(E\S(j))
for all E ⊆ N, and S(j) ⊂ S(i) it follows that
mωi (N,S, v) =
∑
E⊆N
i∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {i}))
=
∑
E⊆N
i,j∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(E)−rS,v(E \ {i}))=
∑
E⊆N
i,j∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(E)−rS,v(E \ S(i)))
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=
∑
E⊆N
i,j∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(E) − rS,v((E \ S(j)) \ S(i))
=
∑
E⊆N
i,j∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ S(j)))
=
∑
E⊆N
i,j∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {j}))
=
∑
E⊆N
j∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {j})) = mωj (N,S, v).
With (2) it then follows that ϕωi (N,S, v) = ϕωj (N,S, v).
(ii) Suppose that all h ∈ S(i) are dummy workers. Then
(a) rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {i}) = ∑h∈sov(E)∩S(i) v({h}) for all E ⊆ N with
i ∈ E;
(b) rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {j}) = ∑h∈sov(E)∩S(j) v({h}) for all j ∈ S(i) ∩ E;
(c) S(i) ∩ S(j) = S(j) for all j ∈ S(i);
(d) rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {j}) = 0 if j ∈ S(i) ∩ E, i ∈ E.
With this it follows that
mωi (N,S, v) =
∑
E⊆N
i∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {i}))
=
∑
E⊆N
i∈E
ω|E|
⎛
⎝
∑
h∈sov(E)∩S(i)
v({h})
⎞
⎠
=
∑
E⊆N
i∈E
∑
j∈S(i)∩E
ω|E|
⎛
⎝
∑
h∈sov(E)∩S(i)∩S(j)
v({h})
⎞
⎠
=
∑
j∈S(i)
∑
E⊆N
i,j∈E
ω|E|
⎛
⎝
∑
h∈sov(E)∩S(j)
v({h})
⎞
⎠
=
∑
j∈S(i)
∑
E⊆N
i,j∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {j}))
=
∑
j∈S(i)
∑
E⊆N
j∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {j})) =
∑
j∈S(i)
mωj (N,S, v).
With (2) it then follows that ϕωi (N,S, v) =
∑
j∈S(i) ϕωj (N,S, v).
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Appendix B: Proofs of Sect. 5
In this appendix, we give the proofs of Sect. 5 and show logical independence
of the properties of Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1
It is straightforward and left to the reader to verify that the wage functions
ϕω satisfy these properties. To show uniqueness,15 suppose that ϕ is a wage
function that satisfies the five properties (with ω-additivity for some positive
weight system) and let (N,S, v) be a hierarchical production game. To show that
ϕ(N,S, v) = ϕω(N,S, v), first consider for every T ⊆ WS, T = ∅, and α > 0,
the production game vT,α : 2WS → R+ given by vT,α(E) = α if T ⊆ E, and
vT,α(E) = 0 otherwise (in game theoretic terms such production games are
positively scaled unanimity games). Let I(T,S) := {i ∈ N | T ∩ ({i} ∪̂S(i)) = ∅}
be the set of all inessential employees in (N,S, vT,α). The necessary worker
property implies that there exists a constant c∗ ∈ R such that ϕi(N,S, vT,α) = c∗
for all i ∈ WS \ I(T,S), and ϕi(N,S, vT,α) ≤ c∗ for all other employees. With
vertical monotonicity it follows that ϕi(N,S, vT,α) ≥ c∗ for all i ∈ MS \ I(T,S).
Thus ϕi(N,S, vT,α) = c∗ for all i ∈ N \ I(T,S). The inessential employee prop-
erty implies that ϕi(N,S, vT,α) = 0 for all i ∈ I(T,S). Then, budget neutrality
determines that c∗ = α|N\I(T,S)| . Thus ϕ(N,S, vT,α) is uniquely determined in
case α > 0.
If α < 0 then vT,−α is a monotone supermodular production game. Since
vT,α(E) + vT,−α(E) = 0 for all E ⊆ WS, it follows with ω-additivity that also in
this case ϕ(N,S, vT,α) is uniquely determined.
Since for every production game v : 2WS → R+ the numbers αT , T ⊆ WS,
such that v = ∑T⊆WS,T =∅ vT,αT are unique (see Shapley 1953) and above we
determined the values ϕ(N,S, vT,αT ), ω-additivity of ϕ implies that ϕ(N,S, v) is
uniquely determined. Thus, there can be atmost one wage function that satisfies
the five properties. Since the wage function ϕω satisfies the five properties ϕ
must be equal to ϕω. unionsq
We show logical independence of the five properties used in characterizing
the WAMC-wage functions ϕω by the following alternative wage functions:
1. For α > 0, α = 1, the wage function ϕαω satisfies the axioms of Theorem
5.1 except budget neutrality.
2. The wage function ϕ that assigns to every hierarchically structured firm
wages given by the Shapley value of the game v, i.e. Shi(v) = ∑E⊆N
i∈E
ω|E| ·
(v(E)−v(E\{i})), satisfies the axioms of Theorem 5.1 except vertical mono-
tonicity.
15 For the Shapley wage function this proof is implicitly given in van den Brink (1997). Here we
generalize this proof along similar lines as the Shapley share function for TU-games is generalized
in van der Laan and van den Brink (1998).
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3. The wage function ϕ that distributes the total production value v(WS)
equally over all employees (i.e. ϕi(N,S, v) = v(WS)|N| for all i ∈ N) satisfies
the axioms of Theorem 5.1 except the inessential employee property.
4. The wage function that assigns the total production output value to the top,
i.e. ϕi0(N,S, v) = v(WS), and ϕi(N,S, v) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ {i0}, satisfies the
axioms of Theorem 5.1 except the necessary worker property.
5. Every WAMC-wage function ϕω, ω = ω, satisfies the axioms of Theorem
5.1 except ω-additivity.
Proof of Proposition 5.2
This proposition follows since for every E ⊆ N, i ∈ E, we have that ∑E⊆N
i∈E
ω|E| ·
(r∗S,v(E) − r∗S,v(E \ {i})) =
∑
E⊆N
i∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(N) − rS,v(N \ E) − rS,v(N) + rS,v(N \
(E \ {i}))) = ∑E⊆N
i∈E
ω|E|(rS,v(N \ (E \ {i})) − rS,v(N \ E)) = ∑E⊆N
i∈E
ω|E|(rS,v((N \
E) ∪ {i})) − rS,v(N \ E)) = ∑E⊆N
i∈E
ω|N|−|E|+1(rS,v(E) − rS,v(E \ {i})).
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